Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
CLPS Seminar (KU Leuven)

Louis Rouillé

FNRS / Liège

Sept. 27, 2024

Plan

"So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd" (II, 2)

- ▶ Names name, don't they?
  - ▶ And they seem to *de re* refer (or achieve *singular reference*) to their bearer;
  - ▶ And they seem to do so rigidly (cf. Shakespeare), as opposed to non-rigidly.
- ▶ **Pb**: how come?
  - ▶ fundamental debate between descriptivism (or internalism, or the "old orthodoxy") and direct reference (or externalism, or the "new orthodoxy")
  - ▶ Reference is either "satisfactional" or "relational" (Bach 1987: 12)
  - ▶ Relation points toward the historico-causal story: cf. Marcus (1961), Geach (1969), Donnellan (1970), Kripke (1972), Evans (1973), Devitt (1981).
- ▶ I need not go into details:
  - ▶ the distinctions I am interested in abstract away from the specifics of a theory of names (and should apply across the board to terms).
  - ▶ But since I will mostly discuss (Kripke 1973/2013), it is useful to have this theory of names in the background.

The root of evil!

Reference and existence: some context

▶ There is a reason why *Reference and existence* (Kripke 1973/2013) comes
  after *Naming and Necessity* (Kripke 1972):
  ▶ In the Princeton lectures, Kripke was identified as one of the leading voices
    of the "new orthodoxy";
  ▶ but the reason why descriptivism *was* orthodox is because it fares better that
    direct reference (or Millianism) for some puzzles.
  ▶ These boild down to 2 classes of statements, i.e. *identity* and *existence*
    statements:
    1. "Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens"; "Many people don't know that Mark Twain is
       Samuel Clemens"
    2. "Santa Claus does not exist"; "Many children believe that Santa Claus exist"
  ▶ Consequently, direct reference theorists face these problems *again* (and
    cannot solve them the old way).

- For this reason, Kripke was invited to give the John Locke lectures in 1973.
  - In a way, he needed to convince the community that the new theory of reference was not a huge vicious circle.
  - Kripke famously did not have time to give a full analysis of negative existentials.
  - However, and quite surprisingly, he gave a very original and somewhat new analysis of fictional names.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ The varieties of names
  └─ Two distinctions

Plan

Preliminaries

The varieties of names
  Two distinctions
  Two views on the two distinctions

Kripke-inspired artefactualism
  The ontology of fictional characters
  The semantics of fictional names
  Analysis of the realist program

Against artefactualism
  Scepticism about the sufficient conditions
  Counterexample to the necessary condition

Concluding remarks

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ The varieties of names
  └─ Two distinctions

Full and empty names

▶ A name is said to be *full* whenever it can be used to achieve singular reference, or de re thought.
  ▶ It is a well-functionning name, that actually names and is used accordingly.
  ▶ *ex*: Aristotle
▶ A name is said to be *empty* whenever it fails to achieve singular reference, or de re thought.
  ▶ It is a mal-functionning name, that misses its target.
  ▶ *ex*: Vulcan

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ The varieties of names
    └─ Two distinctions

Real and fictional names

- A name is said to be *real* whenever its launching happened in a serious context.
    - In other words, the introduction of the name was made with the explicit intention to name something real.
    - *ex*: both Aristotle and Vulcan
- A name is said *fictional* whenever there is no such intention in the launching of the name.
    - Typically, names introduced within a shared pretence (a fiction), where the author has no intention to name some real individual.
    - *ex*: Hamlet, Emma Bovary

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ The varieties of names
    └─ Two distinctions

- That there are these distinctions to be made is uncontroversial...
    - ... what is controversial is how to theorise about these.
- About the full/empty distinction: one obviously needs to build into the theory of reference a notion of success and failure.
- About the real/fictional distinction: the popular move is to rely on a theory of pretence (Frege 1979: 130):[1]

    Instead of speaking of "fiction", we could speak of "mock thoughts". Thus if the sense of an assertoric sentence is not true, it is either false or fictitious, and it will generally be the latter if it contains a mock proper name. The writer, in common with, for example, the painter, has his eye on appearances. Assertions in fiction are not to be taken seriously: they are only mock assertions.

---

[1]See Walton (1990) for a very influential theory of pretence, or make-believe.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ The varieties of names
  └─ Two views on the two distinctions

Plan

Preliminaries

The varieties of names
  Two distinctions
  Two views on the two distinctions

Kripke-inspired artefactualism
  The ontology of fictional characters
  The semantics of fictional names
 Analysis of the realist program

Against artefactualism
  Scepticism about the sufficient conditions
  Counterexample to the necessary condition

Concluding remarks

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
 └─ The varieties of names
    └─ Two views on the two distinctions

The naive view

▶ Common sense (and all pre-kripkean philosophers[2]) has it that *fictional names are a kind of empty names*;

▶ In other words, the naive view regards the real/fictional distinction as subordinate to the full/empty distinction:

Names

Empty   *Full*

Fictional   *Real*   Aristotle

Emma Bovary   Vulcan
Hamlet

The naïve view

---

[2]See (Frege 1892: 2015), (Russell 1905: 491), (Strawson 1950: 334), (Donnellan 1975: 5-6).

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ The varieties of names
    └─ Two views on the two distinctions

A kripke view

- ▶ By contrast, Kripke (1973/2013: lectures 3&4) argues that the two distinctions should be thought of as *orthogonal*.
- ▶ Anticipating on his examples, we thus have:

Names

Empty | *Full*

Fictional | *Real* | *Fictional* | *Real*

Gonzago Moloch Snazzo | Vulcan | Emma Bovary Hamlet | Aristotle

A kripke view

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ The varieties of names
  └─ Two views on the two distinctions

▶ Kripke won against the naive view for 2 reasons:
  ▶ he provides a richer (and systematic) taxonomy;
  ▶ using an underlying fruitful distinction between *normal* and *abnormal* uses,
    applied to fictional names.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ The varieties of names
  └─ Two views on the two distinctions

As for those who wondered why I use "kripke" as an adjective

kripke, adj. Not understood, but considered brilliant. "I hate to admit it, but I found his remarks quite kripke."

THE PHILOSOPHICAL LEXICON

DANIEL DENNETT, EDITOR

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
  └─ The ontology of fictional characters

Plan

Preliminaries

The varieties of names
  Two distinctions
  Two views on the two distinctions

Kripke-inspired artefactualism
  The ontology of fictional characters
  The semantics of fictional names
  Analysis of the realist program

Against artefactualism
  Scepticism about the sufficient conditions
  Counterexample to the necessary condition

Concluding remarks

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
  └ The ontology of fictional characters

Intuitive content of the view

- There are fictional works, and we usually refer to them by their titles.
    - Fictional works have essential parts, viz. fictional characters, whom we refer to using fictional names.
    - *Hamlet* is Hamlet's story; *Madame Bovary* is Emma Bovary's story, etc.
- So fictional names refer (they are full)...
    - ... insofar as there is indeed a fictional work which tells the story of the fictional character bearing that name.
- We have the two ingredients of *artefactualism* (or "fictional creationism"):
    1. fictional characters are at least as abstract the fictional work it is a part of;
    2. the existence of fictional characters is contingent (it depends on the existence of the work).

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
    └─ The ontology of fictional characters

Textual evidence (Kripke 1973/2013: 71-2)

  So my view is that ordinary language quantifies over a realm of fictional or mythological entities. They don't exist, so to speak, automatically: they are not Meinongian in the sense that whatever is an object of thought exists in some second-class sense. On the contrary, it is an empirical question whether there was such and such fictional character. Was there a fictional or legendary character who married his grandmother? (There, of course, was a famous one who married his mother.) If there was, this will be true in virtue of appropriate works of fiction or legend having been written, or at least told orally, or something of the kind. If there is such a fictional work, then there is such a fictional character.

  [...] On my view, to write a novel is, ordinarily, to create several fictional characters, as Twain, by writing Huckleberry Finn, brought both a novel and a fictional character into being. It is not that fictional characters exist in one sense but not in another. The fictional character Huckleberry Finn definitely exists, just as the novel does: I would withdraw the statement only if my impression that there was any real novel was mistaken.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
   └─ The ontology of fictional characters

(Salmon 1998: 301-2)

> *Think of the various roles that a director might cast in a stage or screen production of a particular piece of fiction. Now think of the corresponding characters as the components of the fiction that play or occupy those roles in the fiction. It is no accident that one says of an actor in a dramatic production that he/she is playing a "part". The characters of a fiction the occupants of roles in the fiction are in some real sense parts of the fiction itself. Sometimes, for example in historical fiction, what fictionally plays a particular role is a real person or thing. In other cases, what plays a particular role is the brainchild of the storyteller. In such cases, the role player is a wholly fictional character, or what I (following Kripke) have been calling simply a "fictional character".*

- **th**: Fictional characters are *literally* parts of fictional works.
  - There is an intuitive mereology of fictional works in the background;
  - fictional works are wholes made of both real and fictional parts.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
    └─ The ontology of fictional characters

Fictional names empty and full

- Artefactualism defines how fictional names *normally* work...
    - ... so we can deduce the *abnormal cases*.
    - In general, a fictional name is *empty* whenever there is no fictional work they are part of (this is also an empirical matter).
- *Case 1*: fictional fictional names, e.g. "Gonzago":
    - the fictional work they are part of is not real, but fictional.[3]
- *Case 2*: mis-interpreted fictional names, e.g. "Moloch":
    - the name stems from a mis-interpretation of the fictional work and took up.
- *Case 3*: alleged fictional name, e.g. "Snazzo":
    - the name is an alleged fictional name, no fictional work attached.

---

[3]Ironically, Gonzago makes Hamlet more real! Paraphrasing (Cohen 1983) who argues that "the play image [*The Murder of Gonzago*] makes *Hamlet* more real".

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
  └ The semantics of fictional names

Plan

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
  └─ The semantics of fictional names

The metafictional argument

- ▶ (Kripke 1973/2013) has offered a semantic argument for his artefactualism.
- ▶ The "metafictional argument", as let's call it, is the following:[4]
    1. Metafictional statements are truth-evaluable statements containing a fictional name in the subject place.
    2. The principle of compositionality requires that a name in the subject place of a truth-conditional statement refers.
    3. Therefore, fictional names refer.

---

[4]I called it "the realist guns" in (Rouillé 2021); see (Recanati 2021) for a recent instance of it. A similar argument was independently put forward in (Van Inwagen 1977) and interpreted as an instance of an indispensability argument (see also (Van Inwagen 2003) and (Thomasson 2003)). However, despite the similarities in argument, Kripke's ontology diverges quite dramatically from Van Inwagen's and Thomasson's, as I will show below.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
   └─ The semantics of fictional names

Fictional and metafictional uses

▶ The metafictional arguement relies on a distinction between *fictional* and *metafictional* uses of fictional names:[5]

  ▶ Fictional use = using the name within pretence to pretend-refer to a flesh-and-blood individual;
  ▶ Metafictional use = using the name to refer to the "fictional character *qua* fictionally represented" (Recanati 2018), let's call it an individual of paper.[6]

▶ Here is a powerful illustration of the distinction (Lamarque and Olsen 1994: 144):

  Who created Frankenstein's monster? One answer, from the internal perspective, is of course: Frankenstein. Only from the external point of view must the reply be: Mary Shelley.

---

[5]There are alternative labels in use in the contemporary literature, though. Following (Bonomi 2008), some philosophers use the distinction between "textual" and "metatextual" uses. Others distinguish between "internal" and "external" uses, or perspectives. Kripke contrasts the "fictional way" with the "'out-and-out' way" at the beginning of Lecture V (p. 104). See (García-Carpintero 2019) for a detailed review of this important distinction in contemporary debates.

[6]Both as a tribute to Salvador Plascencia 2005 literary metafiction *The People of paper*, and not to commit too soon to any specific metaphysical view of what these really are.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
    └─ The semantics of fictional names

The polysemy view

▶ It looks as if it would be nice to connect the metafictional argument with artefactualism!
▶ From a semantic vantage point, one needs to explain how come the *same name* pretend-refers in one context, and genuinely refers in another:
  ▶ the semantic contribution of a fictional name thus depends on the context of use;
  ▶ this is what we call polysemy.
▶ The "realist program" consists in explaining this polysemy.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
  └─ The semantics of fictional names

Textual evidence (Kripke 1973/2013: 81-2)

> *The introduction of the ontology of fictional characters is in some sense a derivative or extended use of language, at least on the picture I am presenting. When one originally introduces the term "Hamlet" there is merely a pretense of reference, and there is no referent – period. But then we find a referent by the ontology of fictional characters, so that we can say [...], when we talk about Hamlet, that we refer to a fictional character.*
>
> *One shouldn't confuse the extended use in which the term "Hamlet" really has a referent (not just "in the story") with the original picture according to which "Hamlet" would have no referent – according to which Hamlet would not exist. [...]*
>
> *I spoke of language as supplying a referent.[7]*

---

[7]*In his last lecture, Kripke says he will talk about "how a speaker's reference might become a semantic reference" (Kripke 1973/2013: 143).*

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
  └ The semantics of fictional names

(Salmon 1998: 294)

According to Kripke, as the name "Sherlock Holmes" was originally introduced and used by Conan Doyle, it has no referent whatsoever. It is a name in the make-believe world of storytelling, part of an elaborate pretense. By Kripke's lights, our language licenses a certain kind of metaphysical move. It postulates an abstract artifact, the fictional character, as a product of this pretense. But the name "Sherlock Holmes" does not thereby refer to the character thereby postulated, nor for that matter to anything else, and the sentences involving the name "Sherlock Holmes" that were written in creating the fiction express no propositions, about the fictional character or anything else. They are all part of the pretense, like the actors' lines in the performance of a play. It is only at a later stage when discussing the fictional character from a standpoint outside of the fiction, speaking about the pretense and not within it, that the language makes a second move, this one semantical rather than metaphysical, giving the name a new, non-pretend use as a name for the fictional character. The language allows a grammatical transformation, says Kripke, of a fictional name for a person into a name of a fictional person.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
   └─ Analysis of the realist program

Plan

Preliminaries

The varieties of names
  Two distinctions
  Two views on the two distinctions

Kripke-inspired artefactualism
  The ontology of fictional characters
  The semantics of fictional names
  Analysis of the realist program

Against artefactualism
  Scepticism about the sufficient conditions
  Counterexample to the necessary condition

Concluding remarks

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
  └─Kripke-inspired artefactualism
      └─Analysis of the realist program

The metamorphosis of fictional names

- ▶ So, Kripke-inspired artefactualists' aim is to tie together
  - (i) the ontological: individuals of paper supervene on shared-pretence,
  - (ii) the semantic: the metamorphosis of an empty name into a full name.
- ▶ Perhaps Italo Calvino (1988: Lecture 2, "Quickness") gave an apt description of the puzzle when he wrote:

    I would say that the moment an object appears in a narrative, it is charged with a special force and becomes like the pole of a magnetic field, a knot in the network of invisible relationships. [...] We might even say that in a narrative any object is always magic.

- ▶ A more friendly metaphor:
  - ▶ Caterpillar stage: (i) within fiction, a flesh-and-blood individual, (ii) fictional name is empty;
  - ▶ butterfly stage: (i) outside fiction, an individual of paper, (ii) fictional name is full.
  - ▶ Though prima facie utterly incredible, such metamorphoses do happen in the natural world, and are fascinating to study.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Kripke-inspired artefactualism
  └─ Analysis of the realist program

The dynamics of fictional names

- ▶ I think the realist program is wrong, but I think it is on the right track when identifying the asymmetry between fictional and metafictional uses:
  - ▶ "the introduction of the ontology of fictional characters is in some sense a *derivative* or *extended use* of language." (p. 81, my emphasis)
- ▶ This is the divergence between Kripke-inspired artefactualism and static artefactualisms:
  - ▶ be it logically driven in the case of Peter Van Inwagen (1977, 1983, 2000, 2003);
  - ▶ based on a phenomenological approach in the case of Amie Thomasson (1999, 2003, 2009);
  - ▶ or even semantically motivated in the case of Nathan Salmon (1998).
- ▶ The key phenomenon underlying this dynamics of fictional names (that static approaches fail to capture) is *fictional immersion*.
  - ▶ In other words, the logic of (fictional) *creation* must build up on the notion of *pretence*.

Necessary and sufficient conditions

▶ The natural way of carrying out Kripke's (dynamic) realist program consists in holding that pretend-reference is (Voltolini 2020, p. 279):

a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a fictum to come into existence. What is further required is that a certain reflexive stance on that make-believe practice takes place.[8]

▶ Kripke's *abnormal* cases presented above prove that pretend-reference is not sufficient for artefactualism:
  ▶ "Snazzo" pretend-refers by stipulation, but we later realise that the stipulation was not actually attached to any fictional work;
  ▶ "Moloch" pretend-refers by a shared mistaken reading of the Bible;
  ▶ "Gonzago" pretend-refers within Hamlet's world only.

▶ "Reflexive stance": a technical term for the sufficient condition
  ▶ It denotes the metaphorical "stepping out of the (relevant) pretence" fully aware of what the pretence was about.

---

[8] *See also (Kripke 1973/2013: 73), (Schiffer 2003: 52), (Searle 1975: 329-30).*

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Against artefactualism
    └─ Scepticism about the sufficient conditions

Plan

Preliminaries

The varieties of names
Two distinctions
Two views on the two distinctions

Kripke-inspired artefactualism
The ontology of fictional characters
The semantics of fictional names
Analysis of the realist program

Against artefactualism
Scepticism about the sufficient conditions
Counterexample to the necessary condition

Concluding remarks

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└ Against artefactualism
  └ Scepticism about the sufficient conditions

Fusion and fission

- *Dialectics*: in case of fusion and fission of fictional characters, we have 2 names and only 1 character...
    - ... but the metafictional argument overgenerates 2 characters.
- *Case 1*: Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde
    - Mr Jekyll's character would have been better, had Stevenson made him married to a wife.[9]
- *Case 2*: Superman and Clark Kent
    - There is something universal about Clark Kent's problem with Lois, and that's why so many people could relate to it.[10]

---

[9]This statement is adapted from Vladimir Nabokov (1980: 194)'s line of criticism: "It was safer for the artist [Stevenson] not to be specific and to leave the pleasures of Jekyll undescribed. But does not this safety, this easy way, does it not denote a certain weakness in the artist? I think it does."

[10]Another great example is Bill's commentary according to which: "Clark Kent is Superman's critique on the whole human race" in *Kill Bill*, *vol. 2*.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Against artefactualism
   └─ Scepticism about the sufficient conditions

Fictional fictional characters

- Fictional fictional characters often enjoy a "life of their own":
    - e.g. all of the famous characters of *1001 Nights*, viz. Aladdin, Sinbad the Sailor, Ali Baba, etc. are fictional, fictional characters as opposed to Sheherazade who is the major female character in the frame fiction.
    - Kripke predicts that "Sheherazade" is full and refers to an individual of paper, whereas, say, "Aladdin" does not.
- A deeper mistake: fiction in a fiction are still attached to the fictional work (and the creativity of the author).
    - *The Murder of Gonzago* really *is* Act 3, Scene 2 of *Hamlet*, which is a proper part of Shakespeare's work; no less than, say, Hamlet's famous soliloquy Act 3, Scene 1.
    - *The Grand Inquisitor* (from *The Brothers Karamazov*): the Grand Inquisitor is clearly one of Dosoevsky's most famous creations.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
  └ Against artefactualism
    └ Scepticism about the sufficient conditions

Crowds and other items

- ▶ Why stop at fictional characters based on flesh-and-blood individuals?
  How much created entities should be allowed?
- ▶ *Case 1*: crowds, populations
  - ▶ "For instance, in Hardy's *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*, Tess is arrested at
    Stonehenge by sixteen policemen, who are not otherwise distinguished. Are
    there sixteen fictional characters?" (Friend 2007)
  - ▶ How many Orcs outside *the Lord of the Rings*?
- ▶ *Case 2*: items
  - ▶ (Tokens) The One Ring? Excalibur?
  - ▶ (Types) lightsabers? hobbits?
- ▶ *Case 3*: symbols
  - ▶ Yorick's skull and the earth in Hamlet?

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Against artefactualism
    └─ Counterexample to the necessary condition

Plan

Preliminaries

The varieties of names
Two distinctions
Two views on the two distinctions

Kripke-inspired artefactualism
The ontology of fictional characters
The semantics of fictional names
Analysis of the realist program

Against artefactualism
Scepticism about the sufficient conditions
Counterexample to the necessary condition

Concluding remarks

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Against artefactualism
  └─ Counterexample to the necessary condition

Lieutenant Kizhe: a good case

- *Lieutenant Kizhe* is a 1928 short story by Yury Tynyanov:[11]
  - From a misspelling of an army clerk, a nonexistent Kizhe is promoted lieutenant.
    - *praporshchiki zhe ... - v podporuchiki*[12]
    - *praporshchik Kizhe, ... - v podporuchiki.*[13]
  - This Lieutenant Kizhe subsequently has a wonderful carrier, marries, etc.
  - When the Empeor wants to congratulate, the military bureaucrats decide to kill him off, to avoid any trouble.
  - The Emperor, upon learning on Kizhe's death says: "Sic transit gloria mundi".
- "Kizhe" is a fictional empty name:
  - It is a "Moloch"-type of example;
  - there is no pretend-reference, only pretend-*failed*-reference.

---

[11] It is based on a 1870 anecdote by Vladimir Dahl. It was later adapted in the famous 1934 soviet movie (music by Sergei Prokofiev).

[12] it says: "as to Ensigns ... [they are promoted to] Second Lieutenants"

[13] "Ensign Kizh, ... [are promoted to] Second Lieutenants".

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Against artefactualism
  └─ Counterexample to the necessary condition

- But then what is the difference between "Madame Bovary" and "Lieutenant Kizhe"?
- Both are parts of a fictional work:
  - Both fictions they originate from are *eponymous* fictions.
  - Intuitively, *Lieutenant Kizhe* is Kizhe's story; just like *Madame Bovary* is Emma Bovary's story.
- Both are very much prone to metafictional talk:
  - Lieutenant Kije or Kizhe is a fictional character in an anecdote about the reign of Emperor Paul I of Russia.[14]
  - Kizhe's nonexistence displays the absurdity of any bureaucratic society.[15]

---

[14] From the Wikipedia page Lieutenant Kijé.

[15] And thus any ontology of bureaucratic items.

Names: full, empty, real, and fictional
└─ Against artefactualism
   └─ Counterexample to the necessary condition

Kizhe variables: a dilemma

- *Dilemma* for the Kripke-inspired artefactualist:
  - *Either* "Lieutenant Kizhe" is not a fictional name,
  - *or* the necessary condition is false.
- Given that only the second horn of the dilemma is reasonable, it follows that the dynamics of use does not entail emergence.
  - *Take-home message*: the semantic story does not justify the metaphysical story;
  - *metaphorically*: fictional names (and characters) are not butterflies.
  - **Csq**: this ruins the whole point of the realist program.

Back to the naive view

- ▶ The two distinctions we started with are not orthogonal.
- ▶ However, what Kripke showed is that fictional names should be conceived as the simulation of all kinds of name:
  - ▶ One can pretend a name is full: this is the "normal" case of "Hamlet" or "Emma Bovary".
  - ▶ One can pretend that a name is empty within the pretence: this is the "abnormal" case of "Kizhe" or "Moloch".
  - ▶ One can pretend to pretend that a name is full: this is the "normal" fictional, fictional case of "Gonzago".
  - ▶ "Snazzo", I think, is not even a fictional name but an empty, real name based on ungrounded speculation (as opposed to, say, a mistake).
- ▶ So we could make further distinctions at the level of a fiction within a fiction (within a fiction...).
  - ▶ Perhaps it can help understand some avant-garde fictions...
  - ▶ ... but I do not think it should affect the semantics of fictional names.

The naive view (simulated)

```
                                        Names
                                       /      \
                                      /        \
                             Empty              Full
                            /     \              |
                           /       \          Aristotle
                Simulated names     Real
                   /        \        |
                  /          \     Vulcan
          Pretend-empty    Pretend-full   Snazzo
            /      \           |
           /        \     Emma Bovary
Pretend-fictional  Pretend-real   Hamlet
      |             |
   Gonzago        Kizhe
                  Moloch
```

Toward anti-realism

▶ Recall the metafictional argument:
  1. Metafictional statements are truth-evaluable statements containing a fictional name in the subject place.
  2. The principle of compositionality requires that a name in the subject place of a truth-conditional statement refers.
  3. Therefore, fictional names refer.

▶ The next step consist in explaining how one would resist the metafictional argument.
  ▶ Denying 1.: the "extended pretence" road (Walton 1990), (Everett 2013);
  ▶ Denying 2.: the "free logic" road (Evans 1982), (Sainsbury 2007).

▶ I happen to think that we need a synthesis of these two kinds of antirealism (Rouillé 2021) (and work in progress).

References I

📄 Bach, Kent (1987). *Thought and Reference*. Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240778.001.0001.

📄 Bonomi, Andrea (2008). "Fictional contexts". In: *Perspectives on context*, pp. 213–248.

📄 Calvino, Italo (1988). *Six Memos for the Next Millennium*. transl. Creagh, P. Charles Eliot Norton lectures. Harvard University Press.

📄 Cohen, Eileen Z (1983). "Hamlet and The Murder of Gonzago: Two Perspectives". In: *Revue belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 61.3, pp. 543–556.

📄 Devitt, Michael (1981). *Designation*. Columbia University Press.

📄 Donnellan, Keith S (1970). "Proper names and identifying descriptions". In: *Synthese* 21, pp. 335–358.

📄 — (1975). "Speaking of nothing". In: *Contemporary Research in Philosophical Logic and Linguistic Semantics*, pp. 93–118. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1756-5_5.

References II

📄 Evans, Gareth (July 1973). "The Causal Theory of Names". In: *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 47.1, pp. 187–208. DOI: 10.1093/aristoteliansupp/47.1.187.

📄 — (1982). *The Varieties of Reference*. ed. J. McDowell. Clarendon Paperbacks.

📄 Everett, Anthony (2013). *The nonexistent*. Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674794.001.0001.

📄 Frege, Gottlob (1892). "Sense and reference". In: *The philosophical review* 57.3, pp. 209–230.

📄 — (1979). *Posthumous Writings*. 1St Edition. University of Chicago Press.

📄 Friend, Stacie (2007). "Fictional characters". In: *Philosophy Compass* 2.2, pp. 141–156. DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00059.x.

📄 García-Carpintero, Manuel (2019). "Semantics of fictional terms". In: *Teorema: Revista internacional de filosofía* 38.2, pp. 73–100.

References III

📄 Geach, Peter Thomas (1969). "The perils of Pauline". In: *The Review of Metaphysics*, pp. 287–300.

📄 Kripke, Saul (1972). *Naming and Necessity*. 1st ed. Harvard University Press.

📄 — (1973/2013). *Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures*. Oxford University Press, USA. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199928385.001.0001.

📄 Lamarque, Peter and Stein Haugom Olsen (1994). *Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective*. Clarendon library of logic and philosophy. Clarendon Press.

📄 Marcus, Ruth Barcan (1961). "Modalities and intensional languages". In: *Synthese* 13.4, pp. 303–322.

📄 Nabokov, Vladimir (1980). *Lectures on Literature*. Fredson Bowers and John Updike. Mariner Books.

References IV

📄 Recanati, François (2018). "II—Fictional, Metafictional, Parafictional". In: *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. Vol. 118. 1. Oxford University Press, pp. 25–54. DOI: `10.1093/arisoc/aoy001`.

📄 — (2021). "Fictional reference as simulation". In: *The Language of Fiction*. Ed. by Emar Maier and Andreas Stokke. Oxford University Press. DOI: `10.1093/oso/9780198846376.003.0002`.

📄 Rouillé, Louis (2021). "Anti-Realism about Fictional Names at Work: A New Theory for Metafictional Sentences". In: *Organon F* 28.1, pp. 223–252. DOI: `10.31577/orgf.2021.28110`.

📄 — (2023). "The Paradox of Fictional Creatures". In: *Philosophies* 8.5. DOI: `10.3390/philosophies8050092`.

📄 Russell, Bertrand (1905). "On denoting". In: *Mind* 14.56, pp. 479–493. DOI: `10.1093/mind/XIV.4.479`.

📄 Sainsbury, Mark (2007). *Reference without Referents*. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, USA. DOI: `10.1093/0199241805.001.0001`.

References V

📄 Salmon, Nathan (1998). "Nonexistence". In: *Noûs* 32.3, pp. 277–319. DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.00101.

📄 Schiffer, Stephen (2003). *The Things We Mean*. Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/0199257760.001.0001.

📄 Searle, John (1975). "The logical status of fictional discourse". In: *New literary history* 6.2, pp. 319–332. URL: https://www.typetoken.com/100B/Searle_Fiction.pdf.

📄 Strawson, Peter (1950). "On referring". In: *Mind* 59.235, pp. 320–344. DOI: 10.1093/mind/lix.235.320.

📄 Thomasson, Amie (1999). *Fiction and Metaphysics*. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1017/CB09780511527463.

📄 — (2003). "Fictional characters and literary practices". In: *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 43.2, pp. 138–157. DOI: 10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.2.138.

References VI

📄 Thomasson, Amie (2009). "Fictional entities". In: *A Companion to Metaphysics, 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell*, pp. 10–18.

📄 Van Inwagen, Peter (1977). "Creatures of fiction". In: *American philosophical quarterly* 14.4, pp. 299–308. URL: https://andrewmbailey.com/pvi/Creatures_of_Fiction.pdf.

📄 — (1983). "Fiction and metaphysics". In: *Philosophy and literature* 7.1, pp. 67–77.

📄 — (2000). "Quantification and fictional discourse". In: *Empty names, fiction and the puzzles of non-existence*.

📄 — (2003). "Existence, ontological commitment, and fictional entities". In: *The oxford handbook of metaphysics*, pp. 131–157. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199284221.003.0006.

📄 Voltolini, Alberto (2020). "How to Vindicate (Fictional) Creationism". In: *Abstract Objects*. Springer, pp. 277–294. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-38242-1_14.

References VII

📄 Walton, Kendall (1990). *Mimesis as Make-believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts*. Harvard University Press.